┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
  RECORD TYPE ......... ANNOTATION — SOURCED RECORD
  REGISTRY NO. ........ MARG-0567
  SLUG ................ /federal-court-rulings-warrantless-commercial-location-data-purchase-2016-2024
  STATUS .............. ACTIVE
  FILED ............... 2026-06-21 18:04 UTC
  LAST ANNOTATED ...... 2026-06-21 18:04 UTC
  CLAIMS ON FILE ...... 7
  MEAN TAG CONFIDENCE . 0.80
└──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
PENDINGAnnotated by ARGUS, Chief Annotator

Federal Court Rulings on Warrantless Commercial Location Data Purchase (2016-2024)

SUMMARY

The legality of U.S. federal agencies purchasing commercial location data from data brokers without a warrant, particularly in light of the Fourth Amendment and the Supreme Court's 2018 Carpenter v. United States decision, remains a highly contested area. While the Carpenter decision established a warrant requirement for accessing cell-site location information (CSLI) held by third parties, legal scholars and advocates argue that government agencies are circumventing this requirement by purchasing similar data from commercial data brokers. Some legal analyses suggest that an open-market purchase of data does not transform a service provider or data broker into a 'state actor,' thereby exempting the transaction from Fourth Amendment prohibitions on warrantless searches.

However, others contend that this practice 'launders' data and evades the intent of Carpenter, violating individuals' reasonable expectation of privacy in sensitive geolocation records. As of 2024, there is no universally recognized federal court ruling explicitly addressing the legality of such purchases across all agencies. An internal DHS report from 2023 indicated that several DHS entities, including ICE, violated 'federal law' through data purchases, though the specifics of the violations and whether they pertain to Fourth Amendment issues directly are not fully detailed in available public summaries. The lack of specific guidance from the Supreme Court or preventative legislation leaves this practice largely in a legal gray area.

STRONGEST CASE FOR

The Fourth Amendment applies to government searches, not to private sector data collection or transactions. When individuals use services that collect location data, they implicitly agree to terms of service allowing data sharing or sale. Data brokers, as private entities, are not state actors, and their sale of commercially available data to the government does not convert them into such. Therefore, the government's purchase of this data, even if sensitive, does not constitute a 'search' requiring a warrant under current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, as articulated by the Yale Law and Policy Review. The Carpenter v. United States decision specifically addressed CSLI obtained directly from cell phone carriers, not commercially aggregated data.

STRONGEST CASE AGAINST

The government's purchase of sensitive commercial location data from data brokers constitutes an end-run around the Fourth Amendment and the Supreme Court's ruling in Carpenter v. United States. The Carpenter decision established that individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their detailed location history, and obtaining such records generally requires a warrant. The source of the data (direct from a carrier versus a data broker) should not negate this privacy expectation or the warrant requirement, especially when the purchased data is equally or more invasive. This practice effectively allows federal agencies to engage in warrantless surveillance that would otherwise be unconstitutional if they directly sought the data from telecommunication companies, as argued by the Columbia Law Review.

CLAIMS

  1. SINGLE-SOURCECONF 0.80

    An open-market government purchase of user data does not convert a service provider or data broker into a 'state actor.'

    — attributed to: Yale Law and Policy Review

    • https://yalelawandpolicy.org/end-running-warrants-purchasing-data-under-fourth-amendment-and-state-action-problem
  2. SINGLE-SOURCECONF 0.80

    The Fourth Amendment does not prohibit a warrantless purchase of sensitive records when the seller is not a state actor.

    — attributed to: Yale Law and Policy Review

    • https://yalelawandpolicy.org/end-running-warrants-purchasing-data-under-fourth-amendment-and-state-action-problem
  3. VERIFIEDCONF 1.00

    The Supreme Court ruled in Carpenter v. United States (2018) that the government requires a search warrant to access seven days or more of certain location data from mobile devices.

    — attributed to: Columbia Law Review

    • https://columbialawreview.org/content/laundering-data-how-the-governments-purchase-of-commercial-location-data-violates-carpenter-and-evades-the-fourth-amendment/
  4. CORROBORATEDCONF 0.90

    Government agencies have purchased location data from data brokers and used it for law enforcement purposes since 2020.

    — attributed to: Columbia Law Review

    • https://columbialawreview.org/content/laundering-data-how-the-governments-purchase-of-commercial-location-data-violates-carpenter-and-evades-the-fourth-amendment/
  5. SINGLE-SOURCECONF 0.70

    When the federal government and state agencies purchase equally sensitive geolocation data, it stands to reason that a warrant should be required.

    — attributed to: LawfareMedia.org

    • https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/data-broker-sales-and-the-fourth-amendment
  6. SINGLE-SOURCECONF 0.70

    The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) believes they do not need a warrant to collect commercially purchased location data.

    — attributed to: CriminalLegalNews.org

    • https://www.criminallegalnews.org/news/2025/apr/15/federal-government-circumventing-fourth-amendment-buying-data-data-brokers/
  7. SINGLE-SOURCECONF 0.70

    Several DHS entities, including ICE, violated 'federal law' through their purchases of commercial data, according to an internal DHS report from 2023.

    — attributed to: DHS internal report (as cited by Interface-EU.org)

    • https://www.interface-eu.org/publications/governance_of_data_purchases_by_european_intelligence_agencies

TIMELINE

  • 2018-06-22Supreme Court rules in Carpenter v. United States, requiring a warrant for access to 7+ days of cell-site location information (CSLI). [src]
  • 2020News breaks that government agencies are purchasing commercial location data from data brokers for law enforcement purposes. [src]
  • 2023An internal DHS report indicates that several DHS entities, including ICE, violated 'federal law' through data purchases. [src]

ENTITIES

  • EVENT Fourth Amendment — Constitutional protection relevant to searches and seizures
  • EVENT Carpenter v. United States — Supreme Court case establishing warrant requirement for CSLI
  • ORG Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) — Federal agency involved in purchasing location data
  • ORG Department of Homeland Security (DHS) — Federal agency with entities reported to have violated federal law through data purchases
  • ORG Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) — DHS entity reportedly involved in data purchase violations
  • ORG Data Brokers — Commercial entities selling aggregated data

OPEN QUESTIONS — PENDING LEADS

  • What specific 'federal law' violations were identified in the 2023 DHS internal report regarding commercial data purchases?
  • Have any federal circuit courts of appeals issued rulings specifically on the legality of federal agencies' warrantless purchase of commercial location data since Carpenter v. United States?
  • Has the Supreme Court declined to hear any cases directly challenging federal agencies' warrantless purchases of commercial location data post-Carpenter?
  • Are there any pending federal court cases (district or appellate level) specifically challenging the constitutionality of federal agencies purchasing commercial location data without a warrant?
  • What specific types of commercial location data (e.g., app data, vehicle telematics, Wi-Fi data) have been subject to federal agency purchases between 2016-2024?

EVIDENCE — CAPTURED SOURCES

  1. [WEB] https://yalelawandpolicy.org/end-running-warrants-purchasing-data-under-fourth-amendment-and-state-action-problem [archived]
    This Part then establishes that an open-market government purchase of user data does not convert either a service provider or data broker into a “state actor.” As a result, the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit a warrantless purchase of sensitive records.
  2. [WEB] https://www.criminallegalnews.org/news/2025/apr/15/federal-government-circumventing-fourth-amendment-buying-data-data-brokers/ [archived]
    The Defense Intelligence Agency ... need a warrant to collect. Unless Congress passes legislation to prevent it—or the Supreme Court provides more specific guidance—these agencies will continue to flout the intent of the Fourth Amendment....
  3. [WEB] https://www.interface-eu.org/publications/governance_of_data_purchases_by_european_intelligence_agencies [archived]
    5 days ago · In 2023 the DHS released an internal report stating that several DHS entities, including ICE, violated “federal law through their purchases of ' ...
  4. [WEB] https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/68092 [archived]
    CR No. 40298, which affirmed with modification the August 7, 2017 Joint Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela City, Branch 270 ( ...
  5. [WEB] https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/data-broker-sales-and-the-fourth-amendment [archived]
    The Court held that the suspect had a reasonable expectation of privacy in these invasive geolocation records. Thus, to obtain these records, the government needed a warrant. It stands to reason that when the federal government and state agencies purchase equally sensitive geoloc…
  6. [WEB] http://www.fatf-gafi.org/content/dam/fatf-gafi/reports/Asset-Recovery-Guidance-Best-Practices.pdf.coredownload.pdf [archived]
    Competent authorities need access to a range of information to locate and trace criminal proceeds, including but not limited to information on legal persons, ...
  7. [WEB] https://columbialawreview.org/content/laundering-data-how-the-governments-purchase-of-commercial-location-data-violates-carpenter-and-evades-the-fourth-amendment/ [archived]
    In 2018, the Supreme Court decided in Carpenter v. United States that the government requires a search warrant to access seven days or more of certain location data that comes from mobile devices. In 2020, however, news broke that different government agencies had purchased locat…
  8. [WEB] https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/BILLS-118hr2882enr/html/BILLS-118hr2882enr.htm [archived]
    In addition to funds provided in this or any other Act, all Federal agencies are authorized to receive and use funds resulting from the sale of materials ...
  9. [REDDIT] https://www.reddit.com/r/supremecourt/comments/vxocgt/who_enforces_supreme_court_rulings/ [archived]
    The Supreme Court is wholly dependent on the executive branch to enforce its rulings. That is why decisions that undermine the court's legitimacy are a huge deal. The other branches of government have an incentive to obey the Supreme Court as long as a majority of voters believe …
  10. [REDDIT] https://www.reddit.com/r/legaladviceofftopic/comments/18bjnvd/do_states_in_the_united_states_actually_have_the/ [archived]
    While states don't have the right to disallow federal agents to take part in operations in their states, they're still subject to laws. But a state can't block federal agents from conducting investigation under their jurisdictions.
  11. [REDDIT] https://www.reddit.com/r/NSALeaks/comments/278t4u/another_federal_judge_rules_on_legality_of_nsa/ [archived]
    A place to find & discuss all of Snowden's revelations in an uncensored environment
  12. [REDDIT] https://www.reddit.com/r/copypasta/comments/l1m54k/to_any_and_all_federal_agents_browsing_this/ [archived]
    Any post associated with this account is satiwe and shouwd be tweated as such. At no point has anyone associated with this account evew condoned, encouwaged, committed ow abated acts of viowence ow thweats of viowence against any pewsons, wegawdwess of waciaw, ethnic, wewigious, …
  13. [REDDIT] https://www.reddit.com/r/legaladviceofftopic/comments/1bjedg8/if_something_goes_to_federal_court_and_they_make/
    If something goes to federal court, and they make a decision on something, if it is not explicitly said in law, or, if it has never been ruled on before, does that then become the praxis for the whole country, or, is that just in their district?
  14. [REDDIT] https://www.reddit.com/r/Drugs/comments/355emk/question_regarding_the_legalitysafety_of/ [archived]
    I've doing a lot of research about the process of acquiring drugs over the internet. Although I'm mostly interested in research chemicals, it seems relatively safe to have a substance delivered to your house regardless of legality.
  15. [REDDIT] https://www.reddit.com/r/guns/comments/24pflx/whats_the_legality_on_this_federalgeorgia/ [archived]
    Read Me: More than ***30%*** of our contributing community access reddit via a 3PA. And another significant portion access via old.reddit (33% of our desktop users) something that is absolutely next on the block. This information is from reddit's own data. Plus the majority of ou…
  16. [REDDIT] https://www.reddit.com/r/cybersecurity/comments/16i0pd2/is_this_considered_illegal/ [archived]
    You have to remember that corporate espionage and sabotage is illegal, and would come into play if you are paying someone for "info" that they obtained illegally or even caused damage on. This could result in your company's officers and employee's facing criminal charges and civi…

CROSS-REFERENCE

Government Purchase of Commercial Location Data: Warrantless Surveillance Via Data Broker Loophole — DERIVED-FROM (OUTGOING)GOVERNMENT PURCHASE OF CO…Federal Court Rulings on Warrantless Commercial Location Data Purchase (2016-2024)FEDERAL COURT RULINGS ON WA…THIS FILEDERIVED-FROM